Unbiasable

Tariffs · Trade & tariffs

When the US raised tariffs, who ended up paying, and did factory jobs come back?

A tariff is a tax on imports, typically used to protect domestic industries or raise government revenue, and federal rules make the importer liable for paying it.

2 sources
  • “Taxes on imports, also called tariffs, are typically used to protect domestic industries or raise government revenue.”

    Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Agricultural Commodities USDA Economic Research Service, 2022 · Government evaluation

  • “The liability for duties, both regular and additional, attaching on importation, constitutes a personal debt due from the importer to the United States which can be discharged only by payment in full of all duties legally accruing, unless relieved by law or regulation.”

    19 CFR § 141.1 - Liability of importer for duties Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, 1997 · Law or ruling

The answer so far

In 2018, one study found tariffs passed fully into import prices, while another found U.S. firms absorbed much of the cost in stores. The USITC estimated steel output rose 1.9 percent while the most affected steel-using industries lost 0.6 percent of production a year; the 2002 steel tariffs did not boost local steel jobs. A 2025 study put pass-through to consumer prices at about 26 percent, relative to less-exposed goods.

8 sources
  • “In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods.”

    The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “Therefore, the full incidence of the tariffs has fallen on domestic consumers and importers so far, and our estimates imply a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018.”

    The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “In US stores, the price impact is more limited, suggesting that retail margins have fallen. Our results imply that, so far, the tariffs' incidence has fallen in large part on US firms.”

    Tariff Pass-Through at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from US Trade Policy American Economic Review: Insights, 2021 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “Also, as a result of the tariffs, U.S. production of steel and aluminum increased by 1.9 percent and 3.6 percent on average, respectively, during this period. In dollar terms, U.S production of steel and aluminum was $1.5 billion and $1.3 billion higher each year, respectively, than it would have been absent the tariffs, on average.”

    Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023 · Government evaluation

  • “Downstream domestic production in the most affected industries in the model decreased by 0.6 percent per year on average, with the largest annual industry-specific percentage decrease in production of 3.2 percent in 2018 in Cutlery and Handtool Manufacturing (NAICS 3322) (table 5.6).”

    Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023 · Government evaluation

  • “President George W. Bush imposed safeguard tariffs on steel in early 2002.”

    Local Labor Market Effects of the 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2025 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “The tariffs did not boost local steel employment but substantially depressed local employment in steel-consuming industries for many years after Bush removed them.”

    Local Labor Market Effects of the 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2025 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “Studying the 2025 U.S. tariffs, we find that about 26 percent of the tariff increase passes through to consumer prices. These estimates are measured relative to less-exposed goods and hold aggregate conditions fixed.”

    The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2026 · Working paper

Where it was tried

  1. United States (2002 steel safeguard)

    National Ended Mar 2002 to Dec 4, 2003

    President George W. Bush imposed temporary tariffs on ten categories of steel imports and a tariff-rate quota on another product.

    3 sources
    • “In March 2002 -- after a comprehensive investigation, the ITC found a surge of imports was causing serious injury to the domestic steel industry -- the President imposed temporary safeguard measures on ten categories of steel products under the authority of Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.”

      Fact Sheet: The Presidential Determination on Steel The White House, 2003 · Law or ruling The administration's own account of its action

    • “After receiving a mid-point review from the U.S. International Trade Commission in September 2003, as required by law, President Bush on December 4, 2003, rescinded the safeguard tariffs in full.6 He took this step just before retaliatory tariffs by the European Union against a wide variety of U.S. exports were scheduled to enter into effect.”

      Steel: Price and Availability Issues Congressional Research Service, 2004 · Government evaluation

    • “The safeguard measures took the form of tariffs ranging from 8 to 30 percent on ten categories of steel products, as well as a tariff-rate quota on one product.”

      Fact Sheet: The Presidential Determination on Steel The White House, 2003 · Law or ruling The administration's own account of its action

  2. United States (Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs)

    National Expanded Since Mar 23, 2018

    President Trump imposed Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in March 2018, and later restored a 25% steel tariff and raised the aluminum tariff to 25%.

    2 sources
  3. United States (Section 301 tariffs on China)

    National Expanded Since Jul 6, 2018

    USTR started duties on selected China-origin products in 2018, later widened coverage and scheduled further rate increases through 2026.

    2 sources
  4. United States (IEEPA tariffs)

    National Blocked by a court Apr 2, 2025 to Feb 20, 2026

    President Trump ordered broad tariffs under IEEPA in April 2025; the Supreme Court held in February 2026 that the law does not authorize tariffs.

    5 sources
    • “including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483),”

      Executive Order 14257: Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff The White House, 2025 · Law or ruling

    • “Following the Supreme Court's ruling on February 20, 2026, invalidating the Trump Administration's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose certain tariffs, President Trump has used a combination of other trade authorities to impose tariffs.”

      Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, 2026 · Government evaluation

    • “Held: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The judgment in No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the judgment in No. 25–250 is affirmed.”

      Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Supreme Court of the United States, 2026 · Law or ruling

    • “The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 percent and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order.”

      Executive Order 14257: Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff The White House, 2025 · Law or ruling

    • “On April 1, 2025, I received the final results of those investigations, and I am taking action today based on those results.”

      Executive Order 14257: Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff The White House, 2025 · Law or ruling

  5. United States (Section 122 import surcharge)

    National Ended Feb 24, 2026 to Jul 24, 2026

    After the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision, President Trump used Section 122 to impose a temporary 10 percent surcharge on certain imports for 150 days; it expired on July 24, 2026.

    3 sources
    • “Following the Supreme Court's ruling on February 20, 2026, invalidating the Trump Administration's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose certain tariffs, President Trump has used a combination of other trade authorities to impose tariffs.”

      Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, 2026 · Government evaluation

    • “Specifically, I find that a surcharge in the form of ad valorem duties on certain imports is required to deal with the United States’ large and serious balance-of-payments deficit. Accordingly, I impose, for a period of 150 days, a temporary import surcharge of 10 percent ad valorem, as described below, on articles imported into the United States, effective February 24, 2026.”

      Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems The White House, 2026 · Law or ruling The administration's own account of its action

    • “With the expiration of the Section 122 tariffs on July 24, 2026, the President imposed additional duties using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and continued to use Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose duties throughout 2026.”

      Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, 2026 · Government evaluation

  6. United States (2026 Section 301 forced-labor tariffs)

    National In force Since Jul 23, 2026

    President Trump imposed Section 301 duties of 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies after USTR’s forced-labor investigation.

    Congressional Research Service, 2026
    • “On July 23, 2026, President Trump imposed tariff rates of 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies resulting from USTR's final determination of its Section 301 investigation into whether the relevant countries had banned—and effectively enforced those bans—on imports made with forced labor.”

      Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, 2026 · Government evaluation

What the numbers did

Compared with similar places
Measured against places or people that did not adopt it.
Before and after
The same place before and after; other changes at the time can blur it.
Official figures over time
No comparison group, so other changes can blur it.

Real income for U.S. import buyers

Went down

For the 2018 tariff episode, Fajgelbaum and coauthors estimated $51 billion in losses for U.S. consumers and firms buying imports; after tariff revenue and producer gains, the net real-income loss was $7.2 billion.

Compared with similar places
3 sources
  • “Import and retaliatory tariffs caused large declines in imports and exports. Prices of imports targeted by tariffs did not fall, implying complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. The resulting losses to U.S. consumers and firms that buy imports was $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP.”

    The Return to Protectionism The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “After decades of supporting free trade, in 2018 the United States raised import tariffs and major trade partners retaliated. We analyze the short-run impact of this return to protectionism on the U.S. economy.”

    The Return to Protectionism The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “After accounting for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real income loss was $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP.”

    The Return to Protectionism The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020 · Peer-reviewed study

Prices of covered imports

Went up

The USITC estimated that a 10 percent tariff raised the price of U.S. imports from China by about 10 percent.

Compared with similar places
U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023

U.S. steel and aluminum production

Went up

The USITC estimated the tariffs raised U.S. steel and aluminum production by 1.9 and 3.6 percent on average, or $1.5 billion and $1.3 billion a year more than without them.

Compared with similar places
U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023
  • “Also, as a result of the tariffs, U.S. production of steel and aluminum increased by 1.9 percent and 3.6 percent on average, respectively, during this period. In dollar terms, U.S production of steel and aluminum was $1.5 billion and $1.3 billion higher each year, respectively, than it would have been absent the tariffs, on average.”

    Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023 · Government evaluation

Downstream production using steel and aluminum

Went down

The USITC estimated production in the most affected downstream industries fell 0.6 percent a year on average; downstream output was $4.2 billion lower in 2018 and $3.5 billion lower in 2021.

Compared with similar places
2 sources
  • “Downstream domestic production in the most affected industries in the model decreased by 0.6 percent per year on average, with the largest annual industry-specific percentage decrease in production of 3.2 percent in 2018 in Cutlery and Handtool Manufacturing (NAICS 3322) (table 5.6).”

    Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023 · Government evaluation

  • “The estimated decreases in the value of downstream production were $4.2 billion in 2018, $3.9 billion in 2019, $1.8 billion in 2020, and $3.5 billion in 2021.”

    Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries U.S. International Trade Commission, 2023 · Government evaluation

Manufacturing employment and output

Mixed

Flaaen and Pierce found that moving an industry from the 25th to the 75th percentile of exposure to each tariff channel was associated with 1.4 percent lower manufacturing employment, with little evidence of an effect on industrial production.

Compared with similar places
2 sources

Washer and dryer prices

Went up

Flaaen, Hortaçsu and Tintelnot found washer prices rose nearly 12 percent in response to the 2018 tariffs, and prices of untariffed dryers rose by an equivalent amount.

Compared with similar places
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019

U.S. agricultural exports

Went down

USDA’s Economic Research Service estimated more than $27 billion in U.S. farm-export losses associated with retaliation by six trading partners from mid-2018 through the end of 2019.

Compared with similar places
USDA Economic Research Service, 2022

Local steel and steel-consuming employment

Mixed

Lake and Liu found the 2002 tariffs did not boost local steel employment but depressed local employment in steel-consuming industries for many years after removal.

2 sources

Consumer prices for tariff-exposed goods

Went up

Amiti, Heise and Weinstein estimated that about 26 percent of the 2025 tariff increase passed through to consumer prices compared with less-exposed goods.

Compared with similar places
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2026
  • “Studying the 2025 U.S. tariffs, we find that about 26 percent of the tariff increase passes through to consumer prices. These estimates are measured relative to less-exposed goods and hold aggregate conditions fixed.”

    The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2026 · Working paper

Retail prices and spending on affected goods

Mixed

Hacıoğlu Hoke and Feler estimated retail price pass-through of 0.15 using realized tariff rates and 0.20 using a tariff-exposure measure; spending on affected goods fell about three times as much as prices rose.

Compared with similar places
2 sources
  • “We estimate the effects of the 2025 U.S. tariffs on households using transaction-level data linked to tariff exposure and a tariff sentiment survey. Using the realized tariff rate, we find retail price pass-through of about 0.15, while our benchmark tariff-exposure measure blends the tariff rate with import penetration and yields a larger price coefficient of 0.20.”

    Paying More and Buying Less: 2025 Tariffs and U.S. Household Spending Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

  • “Aggregate spending on affected goods falls about three times as much as prices rise. Quantity declines drive the contraction in spending and are concentrated entirely in non-essential categories, where households have the flexibility to cut back.”

    Paying More and Buying Less: 2025 Tariffs and U.S. Household Spending Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

Retail prices of Chinese imports

Went up

Federal Reserve Board researchers found retail import prices were about flat year over year until April 2025, after which prices of Chinese imports rose and were almost 8.5% higher in December.

Before and after
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026
  • “Now let's focus more closely on 2025. Figure 4 shows the 12-month percent changes of the source-country price indices for January through December 2025. Until April, the year-over-year inflation on the retail prices for imported goods is approximately zero. Starting in April, retail prices for Chinese imported goods gradually increase and are almost 8.5% higher in December than a year ago.”

    The Slow Climb: How Tariffs Gradually Raised Retail Prices in 2025 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

Federal customs duties

Went up

Treasury records customs duties, including tariff revenue, at $210.3 billion in fiscal 2025, above $76.4 billion in fiscal 2024.

Official figures over time
4 sources

Where the studies disagree

Who absorbed 2018 tariff costs between import and retail?

Amiti, Redding and Weinstein found full tariff pass-through to domestic prices of imported goods. They said the tariffs’ full incidence fell on U.S. consumers and importers.

2 sources
  • “In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods.”

    The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “Therefore, the full incidence of the tariffs has fallen on domestic consumers and importers so far, and our estimates imply a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018.”

    The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 · Peer-reviewed study

Cavallo and coauthors found a more limited effect on U.S. store prices, suggesting retail margins fell, and said the tariffs’ cost had so far fallen largely on U.S. firms.

American Economic Review: Insights, 2021

Why they differ

One study followed the prices of imported goods; the other looked at U.S. store prices, where the effect was smaller, so they describe different points between entry and checkout.

2 sources
  • “In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods.”

    The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 · Peer-reviewed study

  • “In US stores, the price impact is more limited, suggesting that retail margins have fallen. Our results imply that, so far, the tariffs' incidence has fallen in large part on US firms.”

    Tariff Pass-Through at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from US Trade Policy American Economic Review: Insights, 2021 · Peer-reviewed study

How did 2025 studies measure shopper price effects?

New York Fed researchers estimated that about 26 percent of the 2025 tariff increase passed through to consumer prices relative to less-exposed goods.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2026
  • “Studying the 2025 U.S. tariffs, we find that about 26 percent of the tariff increase passes through to consumer prices. These estimates are measured relative to less-exposed goods and hold aggregate conditions fixed.”

    The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2026 · Working paper

Federal Reserve Board researchers found Chinese-import retail prices were almost 8.5% higher in December 2025 than a year earlier.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026
  • “Now let's focus more closely on 2025. Figure 4 shows the 12-month percent changes of the source-country price indices for January through December 2025. Until April, the year-over-year inflation on the retail prices for imported goods is approximately zero. Starting in April, retail prices for Chinese imported goods gradually increase and are almost 8.5% higher in December than a year ago.”

    The Slow Climb: How Tariffs Gradually Raised Retail Prices in 2025 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

A separate Federal Reserve household study reported retail price coefficients of 0.15 or 0.20, depending on how tariff exposure was measured; spending on affected goods fell about three times as much as prices rose.

2 sources
  • “We estimate the effects of the 2025 U.S. tariffs on households using transaction-level data linked to tariff exposure and a tariff sentiment survey. Using the realized tariff rate, we find retail price pass-through of about 0.15, while our benchmark tariff-exposure measure blends the tariff rate with import penetration and yields a larger price coefficient of 0.20.”

    Paying More and Buying Less: 2025 Tariffs and U.S. Household Spending Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

  • “Aggregate spending on affected goods falls about three times as much as prices rise. Quantity declines drive the contraction in spending and are concentrated entirely in non-essential categories, where households have the flexibility to cut back.”

    Paying More and Buying Less: 2025 Tariffs and U.S. Household Spending Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

Why they differ

The studies track different baskets and use different comparisons: less-exposed goods, country-of-origin retail prices, and household purchase records linked to tariff exposure.

3 sources
  • “Now let's focus more closely on 2025. Figure 4 shows the 12-month percent changes of the source-country price indices for January through December 2025. Until April, the year-over-year inflation on the retail prices for imported goods is approximately zero. Starting in April, retail prices for Chinese imported goods gradually increase and are almost 8.5% higher in December than a year ago.”

    The Slow Climb: How Tariffs Gradually Raised Retail Prices in 2025 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

  • “Studying the 2025 U.S. tariffs, we find that about 26 percent of the tariff increase passes through to consumer prices. These estimates are measured relative to less-exposed goods and hold aggregate conditions fixed.”

    The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2026 · Working paper

  • “We estimate the effects of the 2025 U.S. tariffs on households using transaction-level data linked to tariff exposure and a tariff sentiment survey. Using the realized tariff rate, we find retail price pass-through of about 0.15, while our benchmark tariff-exposure measure blends the tariff rate with import penetration and yields a larger price coefficient of 0.20.”

    Paying More and Buying Less: 2025 Tariffs and U.S. Household Spending Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026 · Working paper

Still open

Who is acting on it now

  1. Enacted

    Donald TrumpU.S. President

    President Trump imposed Section 301 tariffs of 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies after USTR’s forced-labor investigation.

    Congressional Research Service, 2026
    • “On July 23, 2026, President Trump imposed tariff rates of 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies resulting from USTR's final determination of its Section 301 investigation into whether the relevant countries had banned—and effectively enforced those bans—on imports made with forced labor.”

      Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, 2026 · Government evaluation

  2. Sued

    California Attorney General Rob Bonta and coalition of state attorneys generalState law officers

    California Attorney General Rob Bonta and Governor Gavin Newsom sued over President Trump’s Section 122 tariffs.

    California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 2026
    • “OAKLAND — California Attorney General Rob Bonta and Governor Gavin Newsom today, along with a coalition of 22 attorneys general and the states of Kentucky and Pennsylvania, announced a new lawsuit challenging President Trump’s imposition of global tariffs using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974.”

      California Sues Trump Over His Unlawful Use of Tariffs — Again California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 2026 · News report California is a plaintiff; this is the state's own announcement

  3. Blocked

    U.S. Supreme CourtFederal court

    The Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs.

    2 sources
    • “Following the Supreme Court's ruling on February 20, 2026, invalidating the Trump Administration's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose certain tariffs, President Trump has used a combination of other trade authorities to impose tariffs.”

      Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, 2026 · Government evaluation

    • “Held: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The judgment in No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the judgment in No. 25–250 is affirmed.”

      Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Supreme Court of the United States, 2026 · Law or ruling

  4. Enacted

    Donald TrumpU.S. President

    President Trump issued a reciprocal tariff order setting an additional duty on all imports that starts at 10 percent and then rises for the trading partners listed in its annex.

    3 sources
  5. Expanded

    Donald TrumpU.S. President

    President Trump signed proclamations restoring 25% tariffs on steel and raising aluminum tariffs to 25%.

    The White House, 2025
    • “Yesterday, President Donald J. Trump signed proclamations to close existing loopholes and exemptions to restore a true 25% tariff on steel and elevate the tariff to 25% on aluminum.”

      Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restores Section 232 Tariffs The White House, 2025 · Law or ruling The administration's own account of its action

  6. Expanded

    U.S. Trade RepresentativeUnited States trade agency

    USTR increased Section 301 tariff rates on covered China-origin products in 2024, with the first increases taking effect on September 27.

    2 sources

In the brief

Sources

Official data1

Government evaluation4

Peer-reviewed study4

Working paper5

Law or ruling7

News report1

Before the next fight over it

See what happened where they tried it.

The brief follows what politicians propose each morning, in their own words, and links the policy pages when one comes up. Free.

Arrives around 6am ET. Free, and it stays that way.

Cancel anytime. Nothing on the site goes behind a paywall.

One payment through Stripe. No account needed.